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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - UPON PROOF OF HIS INSANITY 
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, DUE PROCESS 
DOES NOT REQUIRE LIMITING THE CONFINEMENT OF AN 
INSANITY ACQUITTEE TO THE HYPOTHETICAL MAXIMUM 
SENTENCE HE COULD HAVE RECEIVED. Jones v. United States, 
103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983). 
Petitioner, an insanity acquittee, was confined indefinitely 1 to a 
public mental health hospital after pleading not guilty by reason of in-
sanity to a charge of petit larceny.2 After he was denied release pursu-
ant to the statutory review procedure,3 the acquittee appealed to the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which ultimately affirmed his 
continued confinement.4 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari5 and held that, upon proof of insanity by a preponderance of 
the evidence, an insanity acquittee may be confined to a mental institu-
tion until he regains his sanity and is no longer dangerous to himself or 
others.6 The Court determined that due process did not require release 
or civil commitment when the acquittee had been hospitalized for the 
maximum length of the sentence he could have received had he been 
convicted.7 
Commitment is a legally sanctioned admission to an institution for 
I. Defendant was confined pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-30l(d)(l) (1981), 
which provides that, if a defendant raises an insanity defense and is acquitted 
based on the defense, he shall be automatically committed until eligible for 
release. 
2. D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 22-2202 (1981) (repealed 1982) defined petit larceny as a felo-
nious taking and carrying away of property valued at less than $100. 
The maximum sentence was imprisonment for one year or a fine of $200 or 
both. /d. In 1982, a comprehensive theft and fraud statutory scheme replaced 
§ 22-2202. See D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 22-3801 to -3821 (Supp. 1984). Under§ 22-
3812, theft in the first degree is the taking of property of another valued at $250 or 
more, with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 
Theft in the second degree is the taking of property of another valued at less than 
$250, carrying a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 
3. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-30l(d)(2)(A) (1981) provides for a hearing within 50 days 
of confinement to determine eligibility for release. 
4. In its first opinion, Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978), rev'd, 411 
A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980), rev'd, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 
(1983), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that there was no constitu-
tional requirement that the acquittee be released or civilly committed at the end of 
his hypothetical maximum sentence. On rehearing, Jones v. United States, 411 
A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980), rev'd, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 
(1983), the court of appeals reversed, finding that because the crime committed 
was the basis of the automatic commitment, the procedure was punitive. Finally, 
in Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), ajf'd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983), 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that§ 24-301 was remedial and 
protective and not punitive. Furthermore, the Court determined that the maxi-
mum hypothetical prison sentence bore no relation to the time necessary to treat 
the acquittee. /d. at 376. 
5. 454 u.s. 1141 (1982). 
6. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3052 (1983). 
7. /d. 
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an indeterminate periods based on the constitutionally adequate find-
ing of mental illness and dangerousness to self or others.9 Because 
commitment is a deprivation of liberty, it must comport with the due 
process protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 10 Due pro-
cess demands that the nature and duration of confinement bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the purpose of the commitment. 11 If the 
constitutionally adequate basis for the commitment no longer exists, 
the institutional confinement may not continue. 12 
When an individual is threatened with deprivation of physical lib-
erty, due process necessitates a fair procedure. 13 Due process is a flexi-
ble concept, allowing the necessary procedural protections to vary 
depending on the circumstances of the particular case. 14 The proce-
dures required in an action threatening deprivation of a liberty interest 
are determined by balancing three factors: 1) the individual interest 
threatened by the action, 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and 3) 
the governmental interest, including increased costs. 15 In an adversarial 
proceeding, the test is used to determine the government's standard of 
proof to warrant a deprivation of physicalliberty. 16 
In a criminal proceeding, the defendant is presumed sane and has 
the initial burden to present evidence raising a doubt as to his sanityY 
Once the doubt has been raised, some jurisdications require the prose-
cution to establish the defendant's criminal responsibility beyond a rea-
sonable doubt's The remaining jurisdictions, including Washington, 
D.C., require the defendant to prove his insanity by a preponderance of 
8. Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment o/ the Mentally Ill, 24 TEX. L. REV. 307, 
313-14 (1946). 
9. DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 8 (C. Fred-
erick ed. 1978). 
10. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I; 
U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
II. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,738 (1972); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. 563 (1975) (state must have constitutionally adequate purpose for 
commitment). 
12. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
13. J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 534 (1983) (herein-
after cited as NowAK]. 
14. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Some elements the Supreme Court 
has required in various situations are: notice, impartial decisionmaker, opportu-
nity to be heard, opportunity to present evidence or witnesses, opportunity to con-
front adverse witnesses, right to counsel, and a decision based on the record with a 
statement of the reasons for the decision. NOWAK, supra note 13, at 555-56. Crim-
inal defendants may also be entitled to compulsory process, discovery, public 
hearing, transcript, jury, and the government bearing the burden of proof as to 
guilt. ld 
15. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
16. NOWAK, supra note 13, at 561; see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 425 (1979) 
(balancing test applied). 
17. G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MoRRIS]. 
18. Id at 42. 
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the evidence. 19 
The Washington, D.C. statutes considered in Jones provide for im-
mediate commitment of an insanity acquittee,20 followed by a hearing 
within fifty days to determine eligibility for release.21 If further con-
finement is authorized, the committee may petition for release when he 
has recovered his sanity and is no longer dangerous to himself and 
others.22 
In comparison, a civil commitment proceeding is instigated by a 
third party assertinf that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous to 
himself or others.2 The Washington, D.C. civil commitment scheme 
provides for a hearing before the Commission on Mental Health, 24 fol-
lowed by a report of the Commission's findings to the Superior Court.25 
The potential committee is entitled to a jury triaP6 or court hearing 
with notice.27 If committed, the individual may petition for release 
when no longer mentally ill or dangerous.28 
In the District of Columbia, automatic criminal and civil commit-
ment both require the same substantive findings: mental illness and 
dangerousness to self or others.29 Also, both schemes forovide for a ju-
dicial hearing with notice and assistance of counsel. 0 The two pro-
ceedings differ, however, as to the burden of proof required and who 
bears the burden of proof. In automatic criminal commitment, the ac-
quittee has already proven his insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence at his criminal triaP 1 In civil commitment, the government 
must prove the potential committee's mental illness. The Supreme 
Court in Addington v. Texas 32 held that due process requires proof of 
insanity by clear and convincing evidence in civil commitment 
proceedings. 
In Jones v. United States, the Petitioner raised three contentions. 
First, he asserted that the criminal trial did not prove mental illness 
19. ld 
20. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 24-30l(d)(l) (1981). 
21. ld § 24-30l(d)(2)(A). 
22. ld §§ 24-30l(e) and 21-546. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit has held that the periodic review provisions of the civil com-
mitment scheme are impliedly included in the criminal commitment statutory 
scheme. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-54l(a) (1981). 
24. ld § 21-542. 
25. ld § 21-544. 
26. ld 
27. ld § 21-545. 
28. ld § 21-546. 
29. Violence is not a prerequisite to commitment based on dangerousness. See Over-
holser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court has 
defined dangerousness as the possibilty that continued liberty will imperil the 
preservation of the public peace. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705,714 (1962). 
30. D.C. CoDE ANN.§§ 21-543 and 24-30l(d)(2)(A) (1981). 
31. ld § 24-30 l(j). 
32. 441 u.s. 418 (1979). 
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and dangerousness sufficiently to justify indefinite commitment. 33 The 
Court stated that the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity estab-
lished, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the acquittee committed the 
criminal act and that he committed the act because of his mental ill-
ness.34 Although the insanity acquittee merely proved his mental ill-
ness at the time he committed the crime, the Court found it reasonable 
and constitutional to assume that the insanity continued and to require 
confinement until recovery.35 Moreover, the Court reiterated its view 
that dangerousness is indicated by the finding, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the acquittee has committed a criminal act.36 The Jones 
Court therefore concluded that a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity was an adequate basis for commitment of the acquittee for treat-
ment and protection of society.37 
Second, the acquittee contended that his indefinite commitment 
was unconstitutional because his insanity was only proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, rather than Addington's clear and convincing 
evidence requirement.38 In considering the proof necessary for civil 
commitment, the Addington Court was concerned with the risk of erro-
neous commitment based on mere idiosyncratic behavior.39 The Jones 
Court found that the risk of erroneous commitment was reduced when 
the defendant asserted and proved his own mental illness.40 In addi-
tion, the finding that the defendant has committed a crime eliminated 
the concern that commitment may be based on idiosyncratic behav-
ior.41 The Court concluded that the concerns in Addington, which re-
quired a clear and convincing standard of proof for civil commitment, 
are not present in automatic criminal commitment.42 The acquittee's 
proof of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, therefore, com-
ported with due process.43 
Finally, the acquittee asserted that automatic commitment of in-
sanity acquittees is punitive in nature.44 Therefore, he contended that 
he should not be confined beyond the maximum period of incarcera-
33. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983). 
34. Id 
35. Id; seeS. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) (reasonable to presume 
insanity continues justifying automatic confinement for treatment). 
36. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983). Although the defendant com-
mitted a non-violent crime, the Court recognized that the commission of a crime 
in and of itself justified labelling the committee as dangerous. Id; see Lynch v. 
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) (the Court equated danger with a threat to 
"the preservation of the peace"). 
37. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3050 (1983). 
38. Id at 3051. 
39. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979). 
40. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051 (1983). 
41. Id (criminal acts are outside range of normal behavior). 
42. Id 
43. Id & n.l7 (the majority notes that a defendant asserting the insanity defense 
would not be benefitted by a requirement of a higher standard of proof). 
44. Id at 3051. 
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tion he could have received if convicted.45 The Court began with the 
due process principle that the nature and duration of confinement must 
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of the confinement.46 Since 
the insanity acquittee was not convicted, he could not be punished 
based on the traditional purposes of incarceration: retribution, deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.47 He could, however, be com-
mitted to treat his mental illness and to protect society.48 Since it is 
impossible to predict the recovery period for any particular case, Con-
gress properly left the duration of confinement indeterminate and pro-
vided for periodic review.49 The Jones Court concluded that the 
purpose of automatic criminal commitment justified indeterminate 
confinement; therefore, due process did not require the release or civil 
commitment ofthe insantiy acquittee at the expiration of his hypotheti-
cal maximum sentence.50 
In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court approved the use of 
the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof standard in auto-
matic criminal commitment.51 The Court's refusal to require the 
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence applicable to civil 
commitment proceedings necessitates a comparison of Jones and Add-
ington. In both cases, the Court balanced the government's interest in 
committing the mentally ill against the individual's liberty interest.52 
The government's interests were the provision of care and treatment of 
mentally ill citizens and the protection of the community from them. 5 3 
The individual's interest was the reduction of the risk of erroneous 
commitment based on mere idiosyncratic behavior.54 
The Addington Court recognized commitment as a deprivation of 
liberty and confirmed that the committee is guaranteed due process 
45. Id 
46. Id (citing the holding in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). 
47. Id at 3052. 
48. Id at 3051. 
49. Id at 3052. In addition, there is no relationship between the severity of the crime 
and the period for recovery, as evidenced by the fact that any acquittee may be 
released after 50 days. Id at 3052. 
50. Id The dissenting justices asserted that the case required a balancing of the gov-
ernmental interest in treating the mentally ill and dangerous, the difficulty of 
proving mental illness, and the liberty interests of the acquittee. Jones v. United 
States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3054 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, the dissent 
found that automatic criminal confinement could exceed the maximum hypotheti-
cal sentence only upon proof of additional facts. Id at 3055. Second, the dissent-
ing justices stated that past criminal behavior alone could not justify indefinite 
commitment; therefore, once the defendant had been confined for the maximum 
hypothetical sentence the government must fulfill the civil commitment burden of 
clear and convincing evidence. Id Finally, the dissent found the liberty interests 
that compel release or civil commitment are risk of erroneous commitment, social 
stigma, and the intrusiveness of confinement in a mental institution. Id at 3060. 
51. 103 S. Ct. 3043 ( 1983). 
52. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
53. Id at 426. 
54. Id at 426-27. 
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protection. 55 The Court held that commitment must be founded upon 
clear and convincing proof of insanity by the state. 56 A lesser standard 
would increase the risk of erroneous commitment.57 The Addington 
Court indicated that only a legitimate, overriding state interest could 
justify increasing the risk of erroneous commitment by requiring the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 58 
Jones presented the same possible indeterminate deprivation of 
liberty that the Court examined in Addington. The Jones Court, how-
ever, was willing to increase the risk of erroneous commitment. First, 
and most importantly, the Court considered the state's legitimate inter-
est in protecting society from the acquittee's proven antisocial behavior 
and continuing mental illness. Second, the individual's liberty interest 
threatened by indefinite criminal commitment is less than in the case of 
civil commitment, since it is he who asserts the insanity defense whose 
liberty interest is at stake. He has imputed knowledge of the conse-
quences of a successful insanity defense. The possibility of indefinite 
commitment is a valid safeguard against fraudulent insanity claims. 
Presumably, those with legitimate claims will assert them in pursuit of 
appropriate treatment for mental illness and not merely to escape 
incarceration. 
The factors justifying differing treatment of Jones and Addington 
committees are best illustrated through analysis of the status of the two 
classes of committees at the time of commitment. In civil commitment, 
a judge or jury analyzes the behavior of the prospective committee to 
determine dangerousness. Because there are no firm delineations of 
"dangerousness," this consideration is extremely subjective, resulting in 
disparate determinations. Moreover, the judge or jury generally has no 
psychological training and must rely on medical and lay testimony. A 
highly subjective method of determination increases the risk of errone-
ous commitment and requires a higher standard of proof in order to 
reduce that risk. 
Criminal acquittees, on the other hand, have been found guilty of 
a crime, but absolved of any responsibility due to their insanity at the 
time of the criminal act. The acquittee's behavior is a threat to the 
public peace and is therefore dangerous. This determination of danger-
ousness is objective in that all insanity acquittees are deemed danger-
ous and in need of treatment because they have been proven to have 
committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The commitment of 
insanity acquittees is not punitive because it is based on the state's in-
herent power to protect the health, safety and morals of its citizens. 59 
55. Id at 425-26. 
56. Id at 433. 
57. Id at 426. The Addington Court also noted that the higher standard of proof 
informs the factfinder of the importance of the ultimate decision. ld at 427. 
58. ld at 426. 
59. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905). 
192 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
The power includes protecting its citizens from the mentally ill and 
dangerous and treating mentally ill citizens. 
Moreover, unlike civil committees, the acquittee is asserting his 
own mental illness. No interest would be served by increasing the ac-
quittee's standard of proof. The recent, overt, antisocial behavior of 
the acquittee, as well as his own assertions of mental illness, justify the 
lesser standard of proof for commitment of an insanity acquittee. 
The Supreme Court in Jones approved of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard of proof for commitment of insanity acquittees. 
The Court rejected the argument that an acquittee must be released or 
civilly committed at the end of his hypothetical maximum sentence, 
since the purposes for commitment differ from those of incarceration. 
Jones is consistent with Addington because the dissimilar situations and 
interests of civil and criminal committees at the time of commitment 
justify the different commitment standards and procedures. 
Lori Lynn Blair 
